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THE FIRST PRINCIPLES APPROACH TO
ANTITRUST, KODAK, AND ANTITRUST
AT THE MILLENNIUM
STEVEN

C.

SALOP*

I. INTRODUCTION

In this essay, I reflect on an important contribution to the development
of antitrust reasoning and law that arises out of the Supreme Court's
decision in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Technical Services, Inc. l In particular, I
discuss the decision's relationship to what I have termed the "first principles" approach to market power and antitrust. In my view, one reason
that Kodak is important is that it does not take a wooden approach in
its economic reasoning. Instead, the opinion nimbly applies the basic
principles of competitive analysis to a difficult dynamic context. This
enables the majority to avoid rigid adherence to a single brand of economic orthodoxy, a strength demonstrated by the opinion's evaluations
of market definition and market power. This willingness to adapt to
the continuing advances of economic analysis arising from new market
conditions and new intellectual insights suggests that antitrust law is less
likely to become an anachronism that will be superceded by some other
form of governmental oversight. 2
Let me briefly note one issue that I will not discuss in this article. One
controversy surrounding Kodak has centered on whether or not the

* Professor of Economics and Law, Georgetown University Law Center. This essay
builds on the analysis in Steven C. Salop, Kodak as Post-Chicago Law and Economics, CRA
PERSPECTIVES, Apr. 1993. I also have benefited from two recent articles: Benjamin Klein,
Market Power in Antitrust: Economic Analysis After Kodak, 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REv. 43, 72 (1993);
Gregory J. Werden, Demand Elasticities in Antitrust Analysis, 66 ANTITRUST LJ. 363 (1998).
I would like to acknowledge the helpful comments of jonathan Baker, joseph Brodley,
Robin Feldman, Luke Froeb, George Hay, Alfred Kahn, Thomas Krattenmaker, Michael
Riordan, Richard Taranto, Gregory Werden, and Christine Wilson.
I Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servo Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
2 For example, we have now learned from the prequel to the trilogy, that the Star Wars
depicted in the George Lucas films apparently started with a dispute over monopolized
trade routes. Perhaps if thejedi warriors of the Galactic Republic had developed a stronger
and more credible antitrust policy, the resulting violence, high prices, and deadweight
losses could have been avoided.
187
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plaintiffs stated a proper antitrust claim, as opposed to a contract claim
or a commonplace marketplace imperfection. Critics also have argued
that the plaintiffs' claim should have been dismissed because the installed
base oflocked-in customers is so inherently vulnerable to monopolization
by the firm that sells them equipment that the customers should not be
protected by the antitrust laws. In his dissent, Justice Scalia recommends
just such a hands-off approach towards this "wretched class" of consumers that suffers "the supposed misfortune of being 'locked in' to Kodak
equipment."3 He states that "[w]e have never suggested that the principal
players in a market with such commonplace informational deficiencies
... exercise market power in any sense relevant to the antitrust laws."4
The majority opinion, however, held that even if manufacturers have
"inherent" market power, "it is not clear why that should immunize them
from the antitrust laws."5
My concern in this article, however, is not whether Kodak was rightly
decided or whether the "wretched class of consumers" has a right to be
protected by antitrust law. Instead, this short essay addresses the analytic
framework for evaluating market power and competitive effects as illustrated by Kodak. Although the Kodak plaintiffs' installed base opportunism theory of anticompetitive harm and the factual conditions under
which the theory could be satisfied are relevant to the issues raised here,
the main focus of this essay is on what I call the first principles approach
to antitrust analysis. The first principles approach centers on an examination of the competitive effects of the conduct at issue. This is appropriate
because competitive effect is the true core of antitrust. Although market
power and market definition have a role in antitrust analysis, their proper
roles are as parts of and in reference to the primary evaluation of the
alleged anticompetitive conduct and its likely market effects. They are
not valued for their own sake, but rather for the roles they play in an
evaluation of market effects.
Market power and market definition, therefore, should not be analyzed
in a vacuum or in a threshold test divorced from the conduct and
allegations about its effects. Instead, market power should be measured
as the power profitably to raise or maintain price above the competitive
benchmark price, which is the price that would prevail in the absence
of the alleged anticompetitive restraint. The competitive benchmark
may be the current price, the perfectly competitive price, or some other
in-between price, depending on the particular allegations of anticompeti3

Kodak, 504 U.S. at 499 n.3.

[d. at 496.
5 [d. at 479 n.29.
4
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tive effect being asserted. This integrated approach to antitrust analysis
is the first principles approach.
The first principles approach can be contrasted to one advocated by
Judge (then Professor) Easterbrook, who suggested that courts should
carry out a threshold analysis of market power at an early stage to use
as a preliminary "filter" to evaluate antitrust claims. 6 Unfortunately, Judge
Easterbrook's threshold test approach is fraught with potential for error.
It is impossible to evaluate market power accurately without understanding the conduct and effect claims at issue and analyzing market power
in the context of those claims.
The first principles approach provides a framework for carrying out
a more accurate analysis. By following this more careful approach, courts
can maintain logic and consistency while avoiding analytic traps and
factual errors. 7 These traps include not only the well-known Cellophane
Trap, but also the Marginal Cost, Price-Up, Threshold Test, and Unilateral
SSNIP Traps. In addition, overly inclusive or incorrectly defined relevant
markets can be avoided. Indeed, it will often be possible to avoid useless
quibbling over the exact scope of the relevant market and focus instead
on the actual factual disputes over the likely effect of the conduct on
consumer welfare.
II. KODAK AND THE FIRST PRINCIPLES APPROACH

The aspect of the Kodak opinion that gives the greatest cause for
optimism is its approach to the analysis of market power (and its building
block, market definition). Market power is a key antitrust concept; it is,
therefore, essential to get the analysis right. In this essay, I discuss the
difficulties involved with identification of the proper competitive benchmark for measuring market power. I advocate reliance on what I call
the first principles approach to market power and anticompetitive
effects analysis.
In standard microeconomic models, market power and monopoly
power are synonyms. Market (or monopoly) power is the ability of a
firm to maximize profits by charging a price in excess of its marginal

Frank E. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1, 14-16 (1984).
7 A number of these points have been made in recent articles, including Lawrence J.
White, Wanted: A Market Definition Paradigm for Monvpolization Cases, 4 COMPUTER INDUS.
1 (1999); Gregory J. Werden, Market Delineation Under the Merger Guidelines: Monvpoly Cases
and Alternative Approaches, 16 REv. INDUS. ORG. 211 (2000).
6
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cost. 8 A "monopolist" may be viewed as a firm with a high degree of
market power. This basic approach was followed in the Kodak opinion. 9
Many judicial opinions and commentators view market power as a
threshold test in which market definition is the necessary first step.
Unfortunately, when market power is viewed as a threshold test in this
way, the analysis can become divorced from the alleged anticompetitive
conduct. 1O For example, Justice Scalia took the view in his dissent that
Kodak lacked market power in parts and service because an increase in
the prices of those aftermarkets would be equivalent to an increase in
the price of equipment. Because Kodak was assumed to lack market
power in equipment, Justice Scalia concluded that it, similarly, could
have no market power in parts and service. 11
This way of stating the argument, however, is totally disconnected
from the Kodak plaintiffs' theory of anticompetitive effect. Defining the
relevant market and gauging market power in such a vacuum is flawed
because it mayor may not lead to a proper evaluation of the conduct
at issue. After all, market definition and market power are not valued
for their own sakes. In a rule of reason analysis, market power and market
definition are important because they provide evidence that is useful in
evaluating the alleged anticompetitive effects.
Separating the evaluations of power and effect is not generally a problem in most merger analyses. The conventional approach to market
definition is consistent with the standard competitive concern raised by
most mergers-that the merger will lead to an increase in price above
the pre-merger level by eliminating competition between the merging
parties. 12 The key issue in such circumstances is whether the acquisition
B To keep the exposition simpler in this essay, I generally will use the term market
power, even in discussing Section 2 allegations.
9504 U.S. at 480.
10 For an earlier treatment of a number of the ideas in this section, see Thomas C.
Krattenmaker, Robert H. Lande & Steven C. Salop, Market Power and Monapoly Power in
Antitrust Law, 76 CEO. LJ. 241 (1987). The market definition discussion of price-down
cases there, however, is superceded to some extent by the analysis in this essay. For a
general approach that is similar to the first principles approach described here, see also
A. Douglas Melamed, Exclusionary Vertical Agreements, Speech Before the ABA Antitrust
Section (Apr. 2, 1998), available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1623
.htm>.
II In a tying claim, proof of distinct products and market power in the tying product
market are required. In his dissent, Justice Scalia argued that replacement parts (the
alleged tying product) and service (the alleged tied product) are not distinct products
because all service may involve the installation of parts. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 495 n.2. Kodak
itself argued that there is no demand for parts separate from service. [d. at 463.
12 As discussed below, analyses of merger cases can be problematic when the relevant
anticompetitive allegation is that the merger will prevent prices from falling in the future.

HeinOnline -- 68 Antitrust L.J. 190 2000-2001

2000]

FIRST PRINCIPLES APPROACH

191

permits the acquiring firm to achieve or enhance its market power. In
other cases, however, where the competitive concern at issue is a different
restraint or price effect, the use of a threshold test disconnected from
the conduct and effect allegations can lead to a variety of "traps" that
can cause analytic missteps and erroneous conclusions.
Market definition and market power should be evaluated in the context
of the alleged anticompetitive conduct and effect, not as a flawed filter
carried out in a vacuum divorced from these factors. The first principles
approach fulfills this goal because it is centered on a direct evaluation
of the competitive effects of the conduct. It does not proceed by relying
on imperfect and indirect proxies for market power, which then are
used as proxies for the likelihood of anticompetitive effects. Only by
analyzing market power and market definition as part of and in reference
to the economic analysis of the alleged anticompetitive conduct and its
market effects can logic and consistency be maintained and errors be
avoided. Similarly, only in this way can relevant markets properly be
defined.
Some of the reasoning in Kodak provides an introduction to the first
principles approach. For example, consider the Kodak plaintiffs' monopolization theory. According to the plaintiffs' "installed base opportunism"
theory of monopolization, for several years Kodak had permitted independen t service operators (ISOs) to purchase replacemen t parts that they
needed to service equipment in competition with Kodak, and consumers
bought equipment on the expectation that this competition would continue. However, Kodak allegedly later adopted a new policy of refusing
to sell parts to the ISOs. As a result of this unanticipated change in
conduct and the new restraint, the installed base of equipment owners
could no longer purchase service from the excluded ISOs. Because they
were locked-in to the equipment they already owned, these customers
were forced to purchase service from Kodak or service their machines
themselves. According to the plaintiffs, Kodak's service was more expensive than the ISOs', and self-service was an inferior alternative for many
customers. Thus, the plaintiffs argued that the locked-in installed base
of customers was harmed by Kodak's change in conduct. 13
This statement of the anticompetitive theory identifies the group of
consumers allegedly harmed by the change in conduct as the owners of
the installed base of Kodak equipment at the time of the change in
conduct. It also identifies a tentative market in which the alleged harm
occurred. To connect power and effect, the question is whether or not
13

504 U.S. at 456-59, 480-85.
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Kodak could exercise market power in this product market as a result
of the exclusionary conduct. The plaintiffs alleged that Kodak's change
in conduct provided it with the power profitably to raise or maintain a
noncompetitive price of service charged to the installed base. 14

Kodak presents a particularly complicated case because three related
markets (i.e., parts, service, and equipment) are relevant to analyzing
the conduct at issue. This complexity illustrates the importance of the
first principles approach. It is difficult even to identify the relevant
market, let alone analyze market power correctly, without reference to
the conduct itself and the alleged anticompetitive effects. When the
alleged anticompetitive conduct and effects are used to anchor the analysis of market power and market definition, however, the analysis is rendered more transparent and more likely to be correct.
In a first principles economic analysis of exclusionary conduct, proof
of anticompetitive effect generally involves proof of both injury to competitors ("power to exclude competitors" or "raising rivals' costs") and
injury to consumers ("power over price"). 15 If this analysis is applied to
the theory asserted in Kodak, the plaintiffs would first need to demonstrate that Kodak had the power to exclude its competitors. If the ISOs
were able to find equally good alternative sources of equally good parts
after Kodak's change in conduct, then Kodak's alleged anticompetitive
strategy would fail. Second, the plaintiffs would need to demonstrate
that consumers were injured. If consumers could substitute equally efficient self-service or could make an even-up trade for alternative equipment, they would not have been injured by the refusal to deal and again
Kodak's alleged anticompetitive strategy would fail. In that case, Kodak
would not have power over price.
I have described these two steps in terms of the proof of anticompetitive effect. However, the evaluation of market power in the service market
is also clearly incorporated into this economic analysis, although not
explicitly labeled as such. If the ISOs or the installed base of customers
could substitute without injury or disadvantage, then Kodak would be
unable profitably to raise or maintain a noncompetitive price of service
to the installed base. Thus, the market power inquiry is part of the
analysis of anticompetitive conduct and effect.
The new equipment market also enters the first principles analysis,
although again not necessarily explicitly. The new equipment market is
14

[d. at 482.

15

For a more detailed analysis of this two-step approach, see Thomas G. Krattenmaker

& Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Rnising Rivals' Costs to Gain Power Over Price,

96 YALE LJ. 209 (1986).
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considered through the analysis of the profitability of Kodak's change
in conduct. When Kodak changed its policy and began to refuse to sell
parts to the ISOs, the installed base was forced to pay a higher cost
for service. Kodak would not suffer an immediate loss of sales of new
equipment to the installed base because that installed base is locked-in
as a result of its ownership of Kodak equipment. In contrast, future
non-captive new purchasers of new equipment might be less willing to
purchase Kodak equipment as a result of Kodak's change in policy. In
particular, Kodak claimed that many, if not all, of these customers would
buy competing equipment with lower life cycle costs. If enough new
customers would substitute, then Kodak's refusal to sell parts, and any
implied increase in the cost of service, would be unprofitable. Thus, it
would follow that Kodak lacked market power in the service and parts
markets because of constraints created by the new equipment market.
This logic is essentially a more detailed statement of Kodak's position.
Kodak focused on the effects of its restraint on non-captive new customers, not on the effects on the installed base of locked-in customers.
In the first principles approach, the parties' competing positions are
made clear because the focus remains centered on anticompetitive effect.
The approach also reaches the market power controversy in a logical
and straightforward way. It reveals that the parties' real disagreement
concerns the facts relevant to estimating the magnitude of the substitution by non-captive new equipment purchasers and its impact on the
profitability of the strategy. Kodak claims that it would lose enough new
equipment customers to render the alleged anticompetitive restraint
unprofitable as a result of the higher life cycle costs and the reputation
loss it would suffer as an opportunistic seller. The plaintiffs claim that
any loss of new equipment purchases would be minimal for two reasons.
First, Kodak could immunize new equipment purchasers from the price
increase by reducing the price of equipment or by offering low price
service contracts in order to keep their life cycle cost from rising. Second,
Kodak's elasticity of demand for new equipment may not be sufficiently
high to render the strategy unprofitable, despite its lack of market power
in the sale of new equipment and any reputational effects that would
result from the restraint.
The Kodak opinion was framed in terms of market power. Indeed, in
its analysis of the per se tying offense, the opinion treats market power
in the tying product market as a threshold test. Under the per se rule,
anticompetitive effect need not be proved but may be inferred from the
other elements as a matter of law. Nonetheless, even the opinion's
analysis of market power in the tying product market was not carried
out in a vacuum. The decision actually analyzes the potential competitive
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effects of the conduct in order to reach a conclusion about market power
in the tying product market. 16 Indeed, its evaluation of market power is
virtually equivalent to an analysis of profitability and anticompetitive
effect in the tied product market. The opinion essentially concludes that
Kodak could have market power in parts because tying service to parts
could be profitable as a result of the lock-in of the installed base.I'
III. MARKET POWER TRAPS

The Kodak opinion's integration of market power and market definition with effects analysis is significant because it avoids a number of
common analytic and factual errors that can occur when the evaluations
of market power and market definition are carried out without the
anchor of an analysis of the alleged effect of the specific conduct at
issue. These errors can be summarized as the following analytic traps:18
(1) The Marginal Cost Trap: Mistaking a firm's inability to profitably

raise price above its marginal cost for an inability to exercise
market power by excluding rivals; and vice versa, that is, mistaking
a firm's ability to profitably raise price above its marginal cost for
an ability to exercise additional market power by adopting alleged
anticompetitive restraints.
(2) The Cellophane Trap: Mistaking a firm's inability to exercise market
power by raising price above the current price for an inability to
have already exercised market power by raising price up to the
current level, thereby mislabeling a completed anticompetitive act
as a lack of market power.
(3) The Price-Up Trap: Mistaking a firm's inability to profitably raise
price above the current level for an inability to exercise market
power by preventing competitors' conduct that otherwise would
reduce price below the current level, thereby mislabeling a maintenance of market power as a lack of market power.
(4) The Threshold Test Trap: Mistaking a firm's inability to profitably
raise price above the current level because of current competitive
constraints from certain rivals for an inability to exercise market
power even after those rivals are excluded.
16 The Court also pointed out that the inquiry could be framed in terms of either market
power or market definition. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 469 n.15.
17Id. at 477-78.
18 All of these traps also could be applied to analyses of the collective market power of
a group of firms.
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(5) The Unilateral SSNIP Trap: Mistaking a firm's inability to profitably
raise price above the current level unilaterally (i.e., assuming that
rivals do not change their prices or outputs) for an inability to
exercise market power by conduct that affects rivals' output and
price responses. 19
These traps are best understood by beginning with the definition of
market power. Market power is the power profitably to charge a price
above the competitive level. In order to evaluate market power correctly
in an antitrust case, it is necessary to identify the proper competitive
benchmark. If the competitive benchmark is defective, then the market
power evaluation may be irrelevant or erroneous.
In microeconomics texts, the standard competitive benchmark for
gauging market power is the defendant's marginal cost. Even aside from
the knotty issues involved in measuring marginal cost, however, the
usefulness of this test for antitrust is limited for a number of reasons.
Most important, using this test in antitrust can lead to false positives and
false negatives in evaluating the competitive impact of specific conduct.
On the false positive side, the test leads to a conclusion that virtually
every firm in the economy will have some market power according to
the test. It is clear, however, that possession of market power measured
in this way does not by itself violate the antitrust laws. Moreover, the
fact that a firm can profitably price above marginal cost does not mean
that the firm can maintain or enhance its power by engaging in specific
conduct alleged to be anticompetitive. 20
The test also leads to misleading conclusions on the false negative
side. There, the fact that a firm prices at marginal cost does not ensure
that there can be no anticompetitive conduct. A firm that prices at
marginal cost could still have incentives to attempt to achieve market
power by acquiring competitors or by raising its rivals' costs. Even if it
must always price at marginal cost, a firm might be able to expand its
19 The Unilateral SSNIP Trap is closely related to the Threshold Test Trap. The two traps
are distinguished because the errors to which they refer occur in different contexts. For
example, the Unilateral SSNIP Trap could arise in a horizontal agreement case as well as
in an exclusion case. In addition, the Unilateral SSNIP Trap focuses on the market definition
methodology whereas the Threshold Test Trap focuses on an erroneous finding of market power.
20 The greater the difference between price and marginal cost, the larger is the effect
on the deadweight loss in economic surplus (consumer plus producer surplus) that results
from changing output, when other factors are held constant. This suggests the need for
greater antitrust concerns in those markets where the difference between price and marginal cost is greater. See Raymond Jackson, The Consideration of Economics in Merger Cases,
43 U. CHI.J. Bus. 439 (1970).
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output and obtain a higher market price once its excluded competitors
shrink their own output. Thus, improperly relying on a measure of
market power based on marginal cost in isolation from the alleged
anticompetitive conduct can lead to the error of the Marginal Cost Trap.
As explained above, one of the key implications of the first principles
approach is the identification of the proper competitive benchmark. The
proper competitive benchmark Jor evaluating alleged anticompetitive restraints in
antitrust is the price that would prevail in the absence oj the alleged anticompetitive
restraints or conduct. 21 This benchmark focuses the analysis on whether
the conduct at issue has an effect on price. Stated in market power terms,
this price benchmark focuses the analysis on the impact of the conduct
on the defendant's degree of market power. 22

This definition also provides the proper benchmark for assessing the
relevant firm's market power in the market in which the anticompetitive
effects are alleged to take place. 23 The precise benchmark, however,
depends on the type of antitrust allegation being made. For example,
if the claim is that certain conduct will permit a firm to raise its price
above the current price level in the future, as in a typical merger analysis,
then the proper benchmark is the pre-restraint, current price. 24 The
current price, however, is not necessarily the proper benchmark for

21 This benchmark is similar to the standard set forth in the draft of the Competitor
Collaboration Guidelines. U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Draft Antitrust Guidelines for
Collaborations Among Competitors (Oct. 1, 1999) § 1.2, reprinted in 64 Fed. Reg. 54,484
(Oct. 6, 1999).
22 Benjamin Klein prefers a market power test based on whether a firm's prices have
any significant effect on market quantities. Klein, supra note 1, at 76. If one broadens the
test, going beyond price to include the alleged anticompetitive conduct and to take into
account the effect of the conduct on rivals' prices and outputs, then Klein's test moves
closer to the first principles approach set out here. The analysis in this article may indeed
be what Klein means when he discusses changes in market power. However, Klein's focus
on market quantities raises the question of whether the two approaches are consistent; the
question is complicated because Klein does not set out a market definition methodology. [d.
at 85.
23 This article's analysis focuses on the market in which the alleged anticompetitive
effects occur. Tying and other leverage theories also involve the evaluation of market
power in a second market, the tying/leveraging product market. The resulting analysis
may still involve a comparison to the perfectly competitive price, particularly in the case
of per se offenses. However, it also may involve the power to exclude competitors profitably.
This is because the fundamental issue is whether a firm has the power to profitably carry
out the alleged anticompetitive leveraging conduct that causes harm in the tied product
market. In contrast, in the case of leveraging used to maintain (i.e., defend) market power
in the tying/leveraging market, the issue does not arise in the same way. See Robin C.
Feldman, Defensive Leveraging in Antitrust, 87 GEO. LJ. 2079 (1999).
24 U.S. Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1992, as amended 1997), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ~ 13,104.
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other kinds of anticompetitive allegations, and ignoring this distinction
can lead to the other traps identified above.
Suppose, for example, that the antitrust allegation is that certain conduct has already permitted a firm to raise its price. In these circumstances,
the proper competitive benchmark is not the current price. Instead, it
is the lower price that would have prevailed absent the alleged restraint.
If the current price is used as the competitive benchmark, the result will
be an erroneous finding of no market power. This is the error that
occurred in the Du Pont case, which now is explained under the rubric
of the Cellophane Trap, or Cellophane Fallacy.25 There, Du Pont engaged
in a variety of conduct that eliminated competition, permitting Du Pont
to raise its price. The Court, however, evaluated market definition as a
threshold filter that focused on the profitability of price increases above
the already achieved monopolized price. That hypothetical price increase
was found to be unprofitable, leading the Court to affirm the finding
of a broad market and a lack of market power by Du Pont. The Court's
conclusions regarding lack of market power also led it to forgo a detailed
analysis of competitive effects. In contrast, in Kodak the Court's analytic
approach allowed it to avoid the Cellophane Trap.26
As another variant, suppose that a plaintiff's antitrust allegation is

that a restraint prevented a price reduction that otherwise would have
occurred. For example, suppose the alleged anticompetitive conduct
deterred the entry of a new efficient competitor. For this price-down
allegation, the proper competitive benchmark should be the price that
would prevail after the price reduction caused by the entry, that is, the
post-entry price. If instead the current price is used as the competitive
benchmark, the result might be an erroneous finding of no market
power. This is the Price-Up Trap.
Using the lower price that would prevail in the absence of the alleged
anticompetitive conduct as the competitive benchmark is appropriate
whenever it is alleged that a restraint will prevent price from falling to
a lower level. For example, this lower price benchmark would apply to
cases that present exclusionary conduct directed against new or growing
competitors, like the facts presented in Lorain Journal 27 or Radiant Burners. 28 This benchmark also would apply to actual potential entry merger
25 United States v. E.l. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S 377 (1956). For the classic
statement of the Supreme Court's error, see Donald Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, 70 HARV. L. REv. 281 (1956). See also Krattenmaker et aI., supra note II.
26 See 504 U.S. at 471.
27 Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
28 Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
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cases, where it is alleged that the merger will prevent entry that would
have led to lower prices. Similarly, it would apply to joint ventures,
horizontal mergers (like Staples), or other agreements where the parties
would be passing future cost savings along to consumers in the form of
lower prices absent the agreement, and where the agreement reduces
or eliminates the parties' incentives to pass on future cost savings to
consumers by reducing competition. 29
Traps can occur, however, even when the current price is the proper
competitive benchmark. Suppose that competitive constraints created by
certain actual and potential rivals (including the producers of substitute
products) currently prevent a firm from profitably raising its price above
the current level. 30 In those circumstances, conduct that eliminates or
reduces the rivals' competitive constraints would allow the firm to raise
its price profitably. For example, the firm might gain power to raise
price by acquiring some of the rival firms or by raising their costs by
foreclosing their efficient access to key inputs. 31 In either case, the proper
competitive benchmark would be the current price. However, a court
using market power as a threshold test might conclude that the firm
lacks market power, given the current existence of these rival firms as
efficient independent competitors. As a result, the court would allow
the firm to engage in conduct that eliminates or reduces the competitive
constraints provided by these very rivals. This clearly erroneous result,
the Threshold Test Trap, can easily occur if market power is used as a
threshold filter, divorced from the conduct and effect allegations.
A court would not fall victim to the Threshold Test Trap in a horizontal
merger case, where the focus of the analysis has always been placed on
post-merger competition. The risk posed by this trap, however, is higher
in an exclusion case. Klors can be used to illustrate this risk. 32 In the
summary judgment motion reviewed by the Supreme Court, the defendant Broadway-Hale argued that it lacked the market power necessary
to create an anticompetitive effect because of the "hundreds of retailers"
with which it competed for the sale of appliances. 33 The Court's language
29 FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D. D.C. 1997). The 1992 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines contain a sentence that could cover this scenario. 1992 Merger Guidelines,
supra note 24, § 1.11; see also Draft Competitor Collaboration Guidelines, supra note 21,
at § 3.32.
30 That is, even a monopolist faces competitive constraints from substitute products,
which place a ceiling on its price. For example, see Judge Hand's discussion of foreign
imports in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 426-27 (2d Cir. 1945).
31 For one example applied to distribution inputs, see ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX 156 (1979).
32 Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
33Id. at 209-10.
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rejecting Broadway's contention is consistent with a concern for the
pitfalls of the Threshold Test Trap. The Court states that "[m]onopoly can
surely thrive by the elimination of such small businessmen, one at a
time, as it can by driving them out in large groups. "34
Erroneous measurement of market power, furthermore, can occur
even when the competitive benchmark is properly identified. Consider
first a case in which the proper competitive benchmark in a single firm
monopolization case is the current price. One analytic approach might
be to try to gauge the defendant's market power by applying a variant
of the SSNIP market definition test set out in the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines and evaluating the profitability of a small unilateral price
increase by the defendant. 35 Microeconomics, however, is premised on
the assumption that an unregulated firm will set the price that maximizes
its profits, a principle that means that a unilateral price increase above
the profit-maximizing level necessarily would reduce profits. As a result,
if the current price is used as the competitive benchmark, and market
power is gauged by examining the profitability of a unilateral price
increase above that benchmark, then no unregulated firm, even a monopolist, would ever be found to have market power. 36 Thus, applying the
standard SSNIP test to a single firm's conduct would be erroneous, or
what might be called the Unilateral SSNIP Trap.
The Guidelines' SSNIP test, however, can be better used to identifY a
group of firms that could profitably raise price above the current level.
In those circumstances, the defendant's market share could be used as
a rough gauge of its market power, along with an analysis of ease of
entry and other competitive factors. To carry out this share calculation
appropriately, however, the shares of the firms affected by the restraint
(e.g., the parties to an alleged agreement plus the parties alleged to be
disadvantaged by the restraint) must be combined with the defendant's
current market share. For example, in horizontal merger cases the share
of the acquired firm is assigned to the acquiring firm. Of course, in
Id. at 213.
A SSNIP is a "small but significant and non-transitory increase in price." 1992 Merger
Guidelines, supra note 24, § 1.0. A unilateral price increase is one that is not followed
by rivals.
!16 Another aspect of this error arises out of a focus on unilateral price increases. The
unilateral SSNIP test assumes that rivals would respond to the firm's price increase by
expanding their output to meet additional demand as consumers substitute. However, it
may be more profitable for competitors instead to raise their own prices in response to
the firm's price increase, and it would be erroneous to ignore this potential price response.
Market power is the ability to profitably raise price, taking rivals' expected responses into
account. Thus, the expected response must be examined; one cannot simply assume that
rivals will maintain their prices at the initial level.
34

35
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order to carry out this market share adjustment, it is necessary to begin
to evaluate the plaintiff's anticompetitive allegations. In addition, the
effect of the alleged restraint on the ease and likelihood of entry must
be evaluated.
The need to evaluate a plaintiff's allegations in order to set an appropriate benchmark is especially acute in cases of completed conduct or
price-down cases where the conduct allegedly prevents prices from falling
as they would in a competitive world. In those circumstances, the competitive benchmark is a price level below the current price, which also makes
the appropriate market share-based test more complicated to apply. For
example, the SSNIP market definition test would have to be based on
the hypothetical lower price that would have existed in the absence of
the restraint. An alternative market power test might be to assess the
likelihood that an agreement between the defendant and the firms
affected by the restraint would lead to an increase in price above the
benchmark price level.3' This test would also need to take into account
the effect of the restraint on entry.
If the determination of the lower price competitive benchmark is
supported by evidence that the restraint has maintained or already
achieved a higher price, then the key analysis of anticompetitive effect
already has been completed. If there is direct evidence of anticompetitive
effect, then a separate test of market power, let alone a threshold test of
market power, is redundant. In essence, the evidence of anticompetitive
effect also proves market power in the affected market.
Recent Supreme Court decisions have recognized this issue and have
permitted direct evidence of the effects of market power to replace
the indirect evidence provided by the market definition/market power
approach. 38 As stated in Kodak, "It is clearly reasonable to infer that
Kodak has market power to raise prices and drive out competition in
the aftermarkets, since respondents offer direct evidence that Kodak did
37 For an example of a test of market power based on collective market share in the
context of exclusionary conduct in joint ventures, see Dennis W. Carlton & Steven C.
Salop, You Keep on Knocking But You Can't Come In: Evaluating Restrictions on Access to Input
Joint Ventures, 9 HARV.J.L. & TECH. 319 (1996).
38 As evidence that this point is indeed a matter of first principles, Fred Kahn pointed
out to me that it was recognized as far back as United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel, 85 F.
271, 292 (6th Cir. 1898), by Judge Taft: "Much evidence is adduced upon affidavit to
prove that defendants had no power arbitrarily to fix price, and that they were always
obliged to meet competition .... The most cogent evidence that they had this power is
the fact, everywhere apparent in this record, that they exercised it."

HeinOnline -- 68 Antitrust L.J. 200 2000-2001

2000]

FIRST PRINCIPLES APPROACH

201

The Indiana Federation of Dentists decision explains the rationale in
more detail: 4o

SO. "39

Since the purpose of the inquiries into market definition and market
power is to determine whether an arrangement has the potential for
genuine adverse effects on competition, 'proof of actual detrimental
effects, such as a reduction of output,' can obviate the need for an
inquiry into market power, which is but a "surrogate for detrimental
effects. "41

A willingness to accept such direct proof of market power is clearly
consistent with the first principles approach. 42 It incorporates the analysis
of market power into the analysis of anticompetitive conduct and effects,
rather than treating market power as a disconnected threshold test. It
also acts as a first line of defense against the various traps discussed
above. Of course, it does not eliminate the need to specify the competitive
benchmark, which ensures that the direct evidence offered is probative.
IV. CONCLUSION
This short review indicates that antitrust is alive and well at the turn
of the millennium. The Kodak opinion indicates that antitrust law is
indeed able to grapple with new economic ideas and to incorporate
them into antitrust analysis. Antitrust is not facing intellectual stagnation.
Nor is it a victim of rigid economic orthodoxy. The nimbleness of recent
antitrust analysis will help to ensure that antitrust does not become an
anachronism that must be replaced by an alternative means of constraining market power.
If the first principles approach is followed, courts will be able to analyze
a diverse variety of antitrust allegations in a single coherent framework.
The analysis of market power will be incorporated into the analysis of
39

504 U.S. at 477.
This approach also has been followed by a number of lower courts. Re/Max Int'l,
Inc. v. Realty One, Inc.; 173 F.3d 995,1016-19 (6th Cir. 1999); see Coastal Fuels of Puerto
Rico, Inc. v. Caribbean Petroleum Corp., 79 F.3d 182, 196-97 (1st Cir. 1996); Rebel Oil
Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995); Flegel v. Christian Hosp.,
4 F.3d 682, 688 (8th Cir. 1993); Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ran., Inc., 899
F.2d 951, 966-67 (10th Cir. 1990); Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F. 2d. 843, 850 (6th
Cir. 1979).
41 FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61 (1986) (quoting 7 PHILLIP
AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAw ~ 1511, at 429 (1986)); see also NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468
U.S. 85, 109-11 n.42 (1984).
42 For a similar commentary in the context of merger analysis, see Franklin M. Fisher,
Horizontal Mergers: Triage and Treatment, 1 J. ECON. PERSP. 23, 30 (1987); Jonathan Baker,
Product Differentiation Issues Through Space and Time: Some Antitrust Policy Issues, 42 ANTITRUST
BULL. 177, 185 (1997).
40
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anticompetitive effects, rather than being divorced from the conduct. It
will, therefore, be easier to evaluate evidence of market power and the
conditions necessary to establish anticompetitive effect. Antitrust will,
therefore, be able to focus on the real issue of the actual benefits and
harms of alleged anticompetitive conduct, rather than becoming entangled in imperfect, threshold tests that provide only indirect evidence of
effects. In addition, antitrust will be able to avoid complicated and often
useless disagreements over the identification of the proper market definition and focus instead on the actual factual disputes regarding the
likely effect of the alleged anticompetitive practices. In short, antitrust
analysis will be less confusing and more accurate.
By maintaining the focus on anticompetitive effects, the first principles
approach can also streamline antitrust analysis. The threshold analysis
of market definition and market power is sometimes used by plaintiffs
as a diversion to cover up a claim's lack of plausibility. By focusing on
effects, this implausibility can be revealed more directly and quickly.
Plaintiffs also sometimes equate claims that a firm has pre-existing market
power with a conclusion that the firm has engaged in anticompetitive
conduct that has anticompetitive effects. By applying the first principles
approach, this error also can be avoided.
In this regard, antitrust law seems to be moving closer to the first
principles approach, which will ensure that the analysis of market power
is not only consistent with, but also furthers, a correct evaluation of the
effects of alleged anticompetitive conduct. It will be clear that the first
principles approach has become firmly established when the first analytic
question antitrust practitioners ask themselves is no longer "what is the
relevant market, " but instead "what is the alleged anti competitive effect?"
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